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Abstract
We study international trade in a model where consumers have non-homothetic pref-
erences and where household income restricts the extensive margin of consumption. In
equilibrium, monopolistic producers set high (low) prices in rich (poor) countries but a
threat of parallel trade restricts the scope of price discrimination between countries. The
threat of parallel trade allows differences in per capita incomes to have a strong impact
on the extensive margin of trade, whereas differences in population sizes have a weaker ef-
fect. We also show that the welfare gains from trade liberalization are biased towards rich
countries. We extend our model to more than two countries; to unequal incomes within
countries; and to more general specifications of non-homothetic preferences. Our basic
results are robust to these extensions.
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1 Introduction
Theories of international trade typically assume that consumers have homothetic preferences,
showing why product differentiation, increasing returns, and firm heterogeneity are crucial in
explaining the extensive and intensive margins of international trade (e.g. Krugman, 1980,
Melitz, 2003, Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein, 2007, Chaney, 2008). While both casual observa-
tion and econometric analyses of consumer budgets suggest that homothetic preferences cannot
be defended on empirical grounds, their nice aggregation properties and high tractability make
them an ideal tool for studying settings in which technology rather than demand factors are
the main driving force of aggregate outcomes.
The assumption of homothetic preferences, however, is clearly inappropriate for studying
how the composition of aggregate income affects consumption and trade patterns. Consider two
countries, Austria and Nigeria. In 2008, their PPP-adjusted national income was roughly of the
same order of magnitude (311 bill US $ and 281 bill US $, respectively). While Austria is small
and rich, with a population of 8.4 mill and per capita income of 37,680 US $, Nigeria is large
and poor, with a population of 152 mill and per capita income of 1,940 US $. Should we expect
the two countries to display similar economy-wide demands for a given set of consumer goods?
Homothetic preferences predict that the representative Nigerian consumer purchases the same
menu of goods as the representative Austrian consumer, but in quantities that are 95 percent
lower. If this were so, trade patterns are unaffected by the composition of aggregate income
and exclusively shaped by supply conditions such as comparative advantages, differences in
factor endowments, trade costs, and other technological asymmetries.
In this paper, we explore the implications of non-homothetic preferences in the context of
the "new" trade theory framework. While the supply side of our model is identical to the basic
Krugman (1980) framework, we deviate from this framework by introducing non-homothetic
preferences in a very stylized way: we assume that consumer goods are indivisible and either
consumed in unit quantity or not consumed at all.1 Prima facie, this assumption may seem
overly simplistic. However it is a "natural" deviation from the standard CES-framework in
the following sense. In our framework, consumption choices are about the number of goods
— the extensive margin of consumption — while a choice along the intensive margin is ruled
out by assumption. This is orthogonal to the standard CES framework where consumption
choices only affect the intensive margin of consumption and a choice along the along the
extensive margin is ruled out by infinite reservation prices (hence even the poorest household
1Preferences of this type were used, inter alia, by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) to study how demand
composition affects technology choices in the development process, by Matsuyama (2000) to study the role of
non-homotheticities in Ricardian trade, and by Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) to study the relationship between
inequality and growth.
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will consume all goods in positive, albeit tiny, amounts).
Adopting this stylized way of introducing non-homotheticities provides a simple and tractable
framework that leads to equilibrium outcomes quite different from the standard model. To
keep things simple and transparent we confine the basic analysis to the most simple case of
two countries. First, we show that, when per capita endowments of the two countries are very
similar, the world economy ends up in a full trade equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, all
goods are internationally traded and consumed in both countries. In contrast, when per capita
endowments of the two countries are sufficiently unequal, a partial trade equilibrium emerges.
The reason is that only households in the rich country consume all goods produced worldwide
whereas households in the poor country can afford only a subset of all goods. In a partial trade
equilibrium, the fraction internationally traded goods increases in the similarity of per capita
endowments. This result is reminiscent of the "Linder hypothesis", according to which more
similar countries trade more intensively with each other.
Second, the partial trade regime provides us with a simple general equilibrium framework
of parallel trade. The partial trade equilibrium is supported by the price setting behaviors
of monopolistic firms. With indivisible goods, the highest price a firm can charge is the
representative consumer’s willingness to pay which is finite. But this may create arbitrage
opportunities. Consider a US firm selling its good both in the US and in China. When
price differences are sufficiently large, arbitrage traders will purchase the good cheaply on the
Chinese market, ship it back and underbid local producers on the US market. Anticipating
this, US firms either set a price such that the incentive for parallel trade vanishes; or US firms
do not supply their product on the world market, but therefore can charge the high price in
the US. The general equilibrium perspective of our model makes the latter fraction of firms
endogenous. This effect is typically not considered in partial equilibrium settings of parallel
trade but has a potentially important impact on trade patterns.
Third, we make precise the relative importance of population sizes and per capita endow-
ments for trade patterns. The country with a large population is more productive because a
smaller fraction of resources is wasted due to (iceberg) trade costs. When per capita endow-
ment differences are small, a higher population can compensate a lower per capita endowment
so that a world economy that is initially trapped in a partial trade equilibrium may switch to a
full trade equilibrium as a result of population growth. However, when per capita endowment
differences are high, a larger population can never fully compensate for a small per capita
endowment. In that case, the world economy remains trapped in partial trade even when the
population grows very large. Hence the impact of population size differs crucially from the
impact of per capita endowments. A higher degree of similarity in per capita endowments lets
the world economy always escape the partial trade regime, whatever the differences in popu-
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lation size of the two countries. In this sense per capita endowments are a more significant
determinant of the trade regime than population sizes.
A fourth main result of our model concerns the welfare effects of trade. Comparing trade
to autarky it turns out that in a full trade equilibrium the poor country gains relatively more
from trade; in a partial trade equilibrium, however the rich country gains more. Moreover,
a trade liberalization (a reduction in iceberg trade costs) increases welfare of consumers in
both countries when the world economy is in a full trade equilibrium. However, in a partial
trade equilibrium, a trade liberalization is beneficial for the rich country but actually hurts
the poor country. The reason is that trade liberalizations deteriorate the poor country’s terms
of trade, because international price discrimination becomes more limited. Exporters of the
poor country need to lower the prices they charge in the rich country to inhibit parallel trade,
whereas exporters of the rich country have no need to adjust their export prices. However,
they must adjust the prices they charge in their home market. This makes selling on the rich
market at unrestricted high prices more attractive - thus, in the new partial trade equilibrium
more firms of the rich country will concentrate their sales exclusively only on the home market
and less products will be available on the world market. Consumers in the rich country benefit
from the decreasing prices of the internationally traded goods, whereas consumers in the poor
country are confronted with a lower range of import goods at unchanged prices.
Our basic model is simple enough to be extended in various directions. We first look at
a world with more than two countries. It turns out that in a multi-country world our result
that a trade liberalization decreases rather than increases trade needs to be qualified. With
many rich and many poor countries, a trade liberalization stimulates trade and welfare due
to more trade within the rich North and within the poor South. However, it decreases overall
trade (and increases the welfare-gap) between the Northern and the Southern region. While
the North gains for sure, also the South may gain when within-South trade increases more
strongly than North-South trade falls.
Second, we allow for heterogenous trade costs. When trade costs differ for the various
products (but are not too large to inhibit trade at all), trade liberalization implies that goods
with high (low) trade costs will be traded more (less). The reason is that high-trade-cost
producers can sufficiently price discriminate hence they have an incentive to sell their product
also in the poor country. For a low-trade-cost producer a trade liberalization implies fiercer
price competition on world markets. Therefore more low-trade cost producers will decide to sell
their product exclusively on the rich home market and not to sell abroad. In such a situation,
it depends on the relative importance of high-cost and low-cost producers whether a trade
liberalization stimulates or dampens international trade.
In a third extension we look at the impact of policy-restrictions on parallel trade. Our
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basic model assumes "international exhaustion" in which case parallel imports are not legally
forbidden. The holder of a product’s property right (patent, trademark, copyright) can no
longer exercise his property right once this product is sold either on the home market or
on the world market - his property rights are exhausted. In contrast, many countries have
implemented "national/regional exhaustion" in which case the property right runs out when
the product is sold on the home market, but does not run out when the product is sold abroad.
It turns out that restrictions to parallel trade help consumers in the poor country but hurt
consumers in the rich country. The reason is a general equilibrium effect. Stronger parallel
trade restrictions encourage producers of the rich country to sell their product abroad while
being able to charge high prices at home. This tends to improve the terms of trade for the
poor country.
The fourth extension explores the consequences of income inequality. In such a context
the level of trade costs and the extent of within-country inequality determine the equilibrium
outcome. For low trade costs there are producers charging high prices selling to the rich at home
and abroad and other producers charging low prices selling to all households. Interestingly, in
such a situation with low trade costs, where inequality arises within countries and not between
countries, lower trade costs actually benefit the poor.
Finally, we show that our model extends to a more general class of preferences where
consumers have a choice not only along the extensive margin but also along the intensive
margin. We demonstrate that, with more general specifications of preferences, a partial trade
equilibrium emerges provided that (i) the derived individual demand functions feature finite
reservation prices (so that some consumers optimally choose not to buy certain goods when
prices are too high) and (ii) demand elasticities decrease (and mark-ups increase) along the
demand function. This makes an equilibrium possible where firms are indifferent between
selling at high prices and small quantities in rich economies or low prices and large quantities
on the world market so that a partial equilibrium (supported by a threat of parallel trade)
emerges.
Several previous papers have incorporated non-homothetic preferences into the new trade
theory framework. The classical contributions are Markusen (1986) and Bergstrand (1990)
who stick to CES-preferences for differentiated products but introduce non-homotheticities
through a homogenous product with a minimum consumption requirement.2 Several recent
2 Important empirical contributions include Hunter and Markusen (1988), Hunter (1991), Francois and Kaplan
(1996), Dalgin, Mitra, and Trindade (2008), and Fieler (2010). Mitra and Trindade (2005) use nonhomothetic
preferences over the industry aggregates to study how income inequality affects trade patterns. Chung (2005)
used quasihomothetic preferences to address Trefler’s (1995) missing trade puzzle. Falkinger (1990) uses non-
homothetic preferences in a dynamic innovator-imitator model. Flam and Helpman (1987) consider qualitative
product differentiation in a North-South model. This model has been extended by Choi, Hummels, and Xiang
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papers abandon the CES-assumption and instead introduce variable elasticity of substitution
(VES-) preferences. One approach, followed by Markusen (2010) and Simonovska (2010) ag-
gregates differentiated consumer goods with a Stone-Geary subutility (with negative required
consumption levels). This formulation implies that firms charge higher prices in richer markets,
an outcome in line with empirical evidence (see e.g. Hsieh and Klenow 2007, Simonovska 2010,
and Manova and Zhang 2009). Sauré (2009) also uses a Stone-Geary subutility and studies
how heterogeneous trade costs affect trade patterns among symmetric countries. Behrens and
Murata (2009) explore the pro-competitive effects of free trade when consumers have CARA-
preferences. They find that trade reduces mark-ups and that low-income countries gain more
from trade than high income countries. These papers focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e. equi-
libria where all goods are consumed by all households worldwide.3 Their approaches differ from
that of our paper, which focuses on the (asymmetric) partial trade equilibrium where some
goods are consumed by all households worldwide, whereas other goods are only affordable to
households in the rich country.
As mentioned above, our paper contributes to the literature by presenting a general equi-
librium model of parallel trade. A large partial-equilibrium literature has explored the de-
terminants and consequences of parallel trade (see Maskus 2000, and Ganslandt and Maskus
2007, for surveys). The empirical relevance and importance of parallel trade is undisputed.
The question whether parallel imports should be permitted or not (or inhibited by appropri-
ate policies) triggers hot political debates in many countries. While empirical evidence on the
quantitative importance of parallel trade is hard to get, existing estimates suggest that parallel
imports are quantitatively important. A large body of empirical evidence has looked at the
pharmaceuticals market, where the pros and cons of parallel trade are most obvious (see Gans-
landt and Maskus, 2004, for an interesting study of parallel trade on prices of pharmaceuticals
in the EU). However, parallel trade is quantitatively important in many other industries. For
instance, KPMG (2003) estimates that grey market sales of IT products could exceed USD 40
billion annually and that price advantages drive grey market activity. According to the esti-
mates of the National Economics Research Association (NERA), parallel imports account for
between 5% and 20% of trade within the EU for goods such as consumer electronics, cosmet-
ics and perfumes, musical recordings, and soft drinks (NERA 1999). In other words, parallel
(2006), who focus on the role of income distribution in determining the trade patterns. Krishna and Yavas (2005)
used consumption indivisibilities in combination with labor market imperfection to explain possible losses from
trade in transition economies.
3Other papers that give up the standard CES framework have studied the role of income inequality on trade
patterns. Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009) use a nested logit demand system in which income
distribution affects quality choice and patterns of trade. Desdoigts and Jaramillo (2009) adopt Lancaster’s ideal
variety approach to study the impact of inequality on trade patterns.
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trade is an important phenomenon and relevant in many markets. It is therefore interesting
to study the determinants and consequences of parallel trade (and/or the threat of it) in a
general equilibrium framework.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic
assumptions and discuss the consumer behavior with non-homothetic preferences. Section 3
first discusses the closed economy case and then applies our basic framework to study patterns
of trade among equally large but unequally rich countries. Section 4 discusses the role of
population size versus per capita incomes. Section 5 extends the model to other relevant
settings such as a multi-country world, restrictions to parallel trade, income inequality within
countries. Section 6 discusses more general specifications of preferences. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by P identical households. Each household is endowed with L units
of labor, the only production factor. Labor is perfectly mobile within countries and immobile
across countries. The labor market is competitive and the wage is W. Hence household income
is y = WL. Production requires a fixed labor input F to set up a new firm and a variable
labor input 1/a to produce one unit of output, the same for all firms.5 Producing good j in
quantity x(j) thus requires a total labor input of F +x (j) /a. Product markets are imperfectly
integrated in the sense that trade costs accrue when goods are traded internationally. Iceberg
trade costs imply that τ ≥ 1 units have to be shipped to the other country in order for 1 unit
to arrive at the destination.
Households spend their income on a continuum of differentiated goods, indexed by j. We
assume that good j yields positive utility only for the first unit and zero utility for any addi-
tional units. Hence consumption is a binary choice: either you buy or you don’t buy. Denote
an indicator x(j) that takes value 1 if good j is purchased and value 0 if not. Then utility
takes the simple form
U =
Z ∞
0
x(j)dj, where x(j) ∈ {0, 1} . (1)
Notice that utility is additively separable and that the various goods enter symmetrically.
Hence the household’s utility is given by the number of consumed goods.
Now consider a household with income y which can choose among (a measure of) N goods
4Note that due to the static setting, we do not need to introduce patents. The design of patents is crucial
for the outcomes in a dynamic setting. Grossman and Lai (2004, 2006) discuss these models.
5An extensive literature has documented the importance of productivity differences between firms. While
relaxing the assumption of homogeneous firms is straightforward, we stick to it in order to keep the supply side
of the model as simple as possible, allowing us to focus on the new effects due to the demand side.
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that are supplied at prices {p(j)}.6 The problem is to choose {x(j)} to maximize the objective
function (1) subject to the budget constraint
R N
0 p(j)x(j)dj = y. Denoting λ as household’s
marginal utility of income, the first order condition can be written as
x(j) = 1 if 1 ≥ λp (j)
x(j) = 0 if 1 < λp (j)
Rewriting this condition as 1/λ ≥ p (j) yields the simple rule that the household will purchase
good j if the household’s willingness to pay 1/λ does not fall short of the price p(j).7 The
resulting demand curve, depicted in Figure 1, is a step function which coincides with the
vertical axis for p(j) > 1/λ and equals unity for prices p(j) ≤ 1/λ.
Figure 1
By symmetry, the household’s willingness to pay is the same for all goods and equal to the
inverse of λ, which itself is determined by the household’s income and product prices. Intu-
itively, the demand curve shifts up when the income of the consumer increases (λ falls) and
shifts down when the price level of all other goods increases (λ rises).
It is interesting to note the difference between consumption choices under 0-1 preferences
and under the standard CES-case. With 0-1 preferences the household chooses how many
goods to buy but there is no choice about the quantity in which a good is consumed.8 Under
CES preferences, a household has a choice about the (positive) quantities of the supplied goods,
but essentially has no choice about how many different goods to buy (due to a reservation price
of infinity it is optimal to purchase each product in positive amounts, whatever its price). In
other words, the stylized case of 0-1 preferences is interesting because this assumption shifts
the focus of consumer choice to the extensive margin, thus deviating from the CES case with
its focus on the intensive margin. In Section 6 we show that our results generalize to more
general preferences, allowing for adjustments on both the extensive and the intensive margin.
6Notice that the integral in (1) runs from zero to infinity. While preferences are defined over an infinitely
large measure of potential goods, the number of goods actually supplied is limited by firm entry, i.e. only a
subset of potentially producible goods can be purchased at a finite price.
7Strictly speaking, the condition 1 ≥ λp(j) is necessary but not sufficient for c(j) = 1 and the condition
1 < λp(j) is sufficient but not necessary for c(j) = 0. The reason is that purchasing all goods for which 1 = λp(j)
may not be feasible given the consumer’s budget. For when N different goods are supplied at the same price
p but y < pN the consumer picks at random which particular good will be purchased or not purchased. This
case, however, never emerges in the general equilibrium.
8The discussion here rules out the case where incomes could be larger than pN , meaning that the consumer
is subject to rationing (i.e. he would want to purchase more goods than are actually available at the available
prices). While this could be a problem in principle, it will never occur in the equilibrium of the model.
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3 Autarky equilibrium and the emergence of trade
Consider an economy living in autarky under monopolistic competition. After incurring the
set-up costs, the various producers have a natural monopoly for their products. Since all mo-
nopolists have the same cost and demand curves and since there is a representative consumer,
we can omit indices. The monopolistic firm faces a demand curve as depicted in Figure 1. This
firm will charge a price equal to the representative consumer’s willingness to pay p = 1/λ and
sell output of quantity 1 to each of the P households.
Without loss of generality, we choose labor as the numéraire and set W = 1. Two con-
ditions characterize the autarky equilibrium. The first is the zero-profit condition, ensuring
that operating profits cover the entry costs but do not exceed them to deter further entry.
Entry costs are FW = F and operating profits are [p−W/a]P = [p− 1/a]P. The zero-profit
condition can be written as p = (aF + P) /aP.9 This implies a mark-up μ - the ratio of price
to marginal cost — given by
μ =
aF + P
P .
which is determined by technology parameters a and F and the market size parameter P. The
second equilibrium condition is a resource constraint ensuring that there is full employment
PL = FN + PN/a. From this equation, equilibrium product diversity in the decentralized
equilibrium can be calculated10
N =
aP
aF + PL.
Market size and technology influence mark-ups in our framework. We will show below that
the mark-up channel is a crucial channel by which non-homothetic preferences affect patterns
of trade and the international division of labor.
Now assume there are two countries, rich and poor, and consumers in both countries have
the same preferences given by (1). Assume further that firms in the two countries produce
different products. Under which condition will the two countries trade?
9Notice that we have argued that p = 1/λ and p = (aF + P ) /aP ; it therefore seems that p is overdetermined,
unless we have λ = aP/ (aF + P ) . To see that this is in fact the case, notice that increasing income by one unit
approximates an increase in L (because income is y = WL and we normalized W = 1). Hence we can write
λ = dU/dL = (∂U/∂N) · (∂N/∂L). Since we have U = N , ∂U/∂N = 1, and we have ∂N/∂L = aP/ (aF + P )
from equilibrium product diversity, this confirms the claim.
10Notice the difference between the 0-1 outcome and the standard CES-case. With CES, the mark-up is
determined by the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods; it is independent of technology and
market size. In fact, the variability of the mark-up with 0-1 preferences will drive many of our results below.
Moreover, with CES, equilibrium product diversity is independent of productivity a and proportional to set-up
costs F and inversely proportional to market size P. We notice that with 0-1 preferences product diversity in
the decentralized equilibrium is equal to the socially optimal product diversity.
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Assumption 1 (Trade condition) τ ≤
p
aF/P + 1.
The above assumption states a sufficient condition for the emergence of international trade.
To see this, consider an entrepreneur shipping τ2 units of his or her product to the other country
so that, due to iceberg trade costs, τ units arrive there. The firm can exchange the remaining
τ units for τ units of a (symmetric) foreign variety ship it back and sell it on the home market
at price p. Thus autarky cannot be an equilibrium if the costs of producing τ2 units falls
short of the (local) autarky prize, i.e. τ2/a < (aF + P) /aP. Solving for τ yields the trade
condition. Note that the trade condition is independent of the other country’s parameters such
as population size, labor endowment, or technology parameters. The above trade condition is
a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the emergence of international trade. We will
assume throughout the paper that Assumption 1 holds.11
4 Trade between equally large but unequally rich countries
Let us now assume that Assumption 1 holds and consider a world economy with two countries
with unequal wealth. We denote variables of the rich country with superscript R and variables
of the poor country with superscript P . To highlight the importance of differences in per
capita incomes as a source of international trade, we start by assuming that the two countries
differ only in per capita endowments, but have equally large populations, hence LR > LP and
PR = PP = P. We also assume that the two countries have identical production and transport
technologies.
4.1 A full trade equilibrium
When the two countries are not very unequal, a possible equilibrium is one in which all pro-
ducers sell on the world market, so that all goods are traded internationally. In such a full
trade equilibrium, the price for a differentiated product in country i = R,P equals the respec-
tive households’ aggregate willingness to pay (see Figure 1), hence we have pR = 1/λR and
pP = 1/λP . Since country R is wealthier than country P , we have λR < λP and pR > pP . By
symmetry, the prices of imported and home-produced goods are identical within each country.
Solving for the full trade equilibrium is straightforward. Consider the resource constraint
in the rich country. When NR firms enter, NRF labor units are employed to set up these firms
and NRP (1 + τ) /a labor units are employed in the production to serve the world market.
Since each of the P households inelastically supplies LR units of labor, the resource constraint
is PLR = NRF + NRP (1 + τ) /a. This is analogous for the poor country P. Solving for N i
11The case when Assumption 1 does not hold (high trade costs), is available upon request by the authors.
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lets us determine the number of active firms in the two countries
N i =
aP
aF + (1 + τ)PL
i, i = R,P.
Now consider the zero-profit conditions in the two countries. An internationally active firm in
the rich country generates total revenues equal to P(pR+pP ) and has total costsWR [F + (1 + τ)P/a].
An internationally active firm in the poor country generates the same total revenues and has
to incur the same labor requirement F + (1 + τ)P/a. Hence, wages per efficiency unit have
to equalize, WR =WP , for the zero profit conditions to hold in both countries. We use labor
as the numéraire in the following, WR = WP = 1. The budget restrictions are therefore
pi
¡
NR +NP
¢
= Li. Combining the zero profit condition with the budget restrictions and the
number of firms lets us express the price charged in country i as
pi =
Li
LR + LP
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP , i = R,P. (2)
The prices of all differentiated products are the same within a country, irrespective of whether
they are produced at home or abroad. Consequently, imported goods generate a lower mark-up
than locally produced goods as exporters have to bear the trade costs fully.12 The mark-ups
(price over marginal cost) producers charge on their home market μiD = ap
i and the mark-ups
set in the export market μiX = ap
i/τ are given by
μiD =
Li
LR + LP
aF + (1 + τ)P
P , and μ
i
X =
1
τ
Li
LR + LP
aF + (1 + τ)P
P , i = R,P.
In sum, the full trade equilibrium has a simple structure: the ratios of rich relative to poor
country varieties, prices, and mark-ups are identical to the ratio in relative labor endowments
(and nominal incomes), i.e. NP/NR = pP /pR = μPD/μ
R
D = μ
P
X/μ
R
X = W
PLP /
¡
WRLR
¢
=
LP/LR < 1. The differences in per capita endowments and incomes translate one-to-one into
differences in prices, hence international trade establishes an equilibrium such that real incomes
and welfare levels equalize between the two countries. Under autarky, on the other hand, the
poor country is clearly worse off than the rich country. As a result, international trade benefits
the poor country more than it does the rich country.
4.2 Partial trade and the threat of parallel imports
Full trade cannot be an equilibrium outcome when per capita labor endowments and hence
incomes between the two countries are very unequal, i.e. when LP /LR becomes small. The
12 In this respect, 0-1 preferences differ strongly from CES preferences, as higher costs cannot be passed through
to prices. With CES preferences, transportation costs are more than passed through to prices as exporters charge
a fixed mark-up on marginal costs (including transportation). Notice limited cost pass-through is consistent
with empirical evidence. A number of empirical studies document that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed
through to prices at the firm level and that prices are substantially less volatile than costs. See Ravn et al.
(2007) and the references quotes there.
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reason is that if countries are sufficiently unequal, a threat of parallel trade emerges. To see
the point most clearly, consider a US firm that sells its good both in the US and in China. The
firm charges a price in China that equals a Chinese household’s willingness to pay pP = 1/λP
and a price in the US that equals the US households willingness to pay pR = 1/λR. Because the
difference between 1/λP and 1/λR is large, arbitrage opportunities emerge. Arbitrage traders
purchase the good cheaply on the Chinese market, ship it back to the US, and underbid local
producers on the US market. This threat of parallel trade also concerns Chinese firms which
both produce for the local market and export to the US. When these firm charge prices in the
US that exploit US households’ high willingness to pay, arbitrage traders have an incentive to
purchase the product in China cheaply and parallel export it to the US.
Clearly, firms anticipate this threat of parallel trade and adjust their international pricing
accordingly. These firms thus take advantage of the large world market but are constrained in
their pricing due to the threat of parallel trade. There is an alternative, potentially profitable,
strategy: a rich-country firm could abstain from trading its product internationally and focus
exclusively on its rich home market. This producer type has a smaller market but can exploit
the rich country households’ high willingness to pay because it is not subject to the threat
of parallel imports. In equilibrium, both types of firms exist simultaneously and the relative
popularity of the two strategies adjusts such that both yield the same profits. (We will see
below that all firms in the poor country are strictly better off selling their product on the
world market rather than limiting their sales to exports to the rich country and not selling on
the local market.) This implies that only a subset of all available products is actually traded,
which is why we call this equilibrium "partial trade" equilibrium.
Denote the price in the rich country of a good that is traded internationally by pRT ;
the price in the rich country of a good that is not traded by pRN ; and (as above) the price
of a good in the poor country by pP . When setting their prices, suppliers of goods traded
internationally anticipate the threat of parallel trade and set a price that just prevents any
incentive for arbitrage. This implies that the prices charged in the rich country for goods
traded internationally may not exceed the corresponding prices for these goods in the poor
country plus trade costs, i.e. pRT ≤ τ/λP , profit maximization implies that this condition holds
with equality. Hence we must have pRN = 1/λ
R, and pP = 1/λP .
The zero profit condition for a traded good is (pRT + p
P )P = [F + P(1 + τ)/a]WR for
an internationally active rich-country producer and (pRT + p
P )P = [F + P(1 + τ)/a]WP for
a poor-country producer. Both types of firms generate the same total revenues and have to
incur the same labor input. As a result, the zero-profit condition requires the compensation
per efficiency unit of labor to be the same in the two countries, WR =WP = 1. The prices of
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traded goods can be calculated straightforwardly from these zero profit conditions as
pRT =
τ
1 + τ
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP and p
P =
1
1 + τ
aF + (1 + τ)P
aP .
The zero profit condition for a rich-country producer that sells his product exclusively on the
home market is pRNP = F +P/a, from which we calculate the equilibrium price of a non-traded
variety
pRN =
aF + P
aP .
In a partial trade equilibrium, domestic and internationally active firms co-exist in equi-
librium. To see why this is an equilibrium, consider the alternative situation in which all
goods produced in the rich country are traded internationally. If all products were sold at a
price that prevented parallel trade, all goods would be priced below the rich-country house-
holds’ willingness to pay. However, this corresponds to a situation where the representative
rich-country household is not able to spend all income. This, in turn, implies that country-R
households have an infinitely large willingness to pay for additional products, which induces
some country-R firms to switch strategy and sell only on their home markets.
In contrast to the rich country, do all producers in the poor country sell their product
both at home and abroad? In principle one might think that country-P producers also have
an incentive to sell their product exclusively in the rich country exploiting the country-R
households’ high willingness to pay (and not to sell their product on the home market to prevent
parallel exports). While such a strategy generates the same total sales, it generates high overall
costs as the country-P exporter also has to bear trade costs. Hence selling exclusively on the
R market is not a profitable option for a P producer.
We are now ready to solve for the partial trade equilibrium. The resource constraint in the
poor country is still given by PLP = NP (F + (1 + τ)P/a) from which we calculate
NP =
aP
aF + (1 + τ)PL
P . (3)
The resource constraint in country R is different from before because now we have to distin-
guish products that are exclusively sold domestically and those that are traded internationally.
Denoting the traded and non-traded goods produced in the rich country byNRT andN
R
N , respec-
tively, the resource constraint of country R is PLR = NRT (F + (1 + τ)P/a) +NRN (F + P/a).
Together with the trade balance condition NRT p
PP = NP pRTP and the terms of trade pRT /pP =
τ we can calculate
NRT =
aP
aF + (1 + τ)P τL
P , and NRN =
aP
aF + P
¡
LR − τLP
¢
. (4)
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4.3 Per capita incomes and patterns of trade
It is straightforward to see the condition under which the threat of parallel trade becomes a
binding constraint on price setting in the rich country, allowing a partial trade equilibrium
to emerge. In a full trade equilibrium, relative prices are pP /pR = LP /LR and the threat of
parallel trade is not binding as long as the price ratio satisfies pR/pP ≤ τ . It follows that the
parallel trade constraint kicks in when
τ =
LR
LP
. (5)
In other words, a full trade equilibrium emerges when per capita incomes are sufficiently similar,
LR/LP ≤ τ , and a partial trade equilibrium emerges when the gap in per capita incomes is
high, τ < LR/LP .
Figure 2 draws condition (5) in the (LP /LR, τ) space. Figure 2 is drawn for values of τ
that satisfy the trade condition of Assumption 1. In region F (full trade), characterized by
high values of LP /LR and intermediate values of τ , there is full trade.
In that region, consumers in the two countries have very similar incomes (and hence the
differences in their willingness to pay are minor) so that the parallel trade constraint on prices
in the rich market does not become binding and arbitrage opportunities do not emerge. In
region P (partial trade), characterized by low trade costs and high differences in average
incomes, a partial trade equilibrium emerges. When relative endowments LP/LR are low, the
difference in willingness to pay between rich- and poor-country households is large, making the
parallel-trade constraint binding.13
Figure 2
Let us highlight how the volume and structure of international trade depend on relative
per capita incomes LP /LR. We define "trade intensity" φ as the fraction of traded goods,
NP +NRT , over the total goods produced worldwide, N
P +NRT +N
R
N . Using equations (3) and
(4) calculating trade intensity in a partial trade equilibrium is straightforward.
φ =
(1 + τ) (1 + aF/P)
1 + aF/P − τ2 + (1 + τ + aF/P)LR/LP if L
P/LR < 1/τ , (6)
Alternatively, the world economy is in a full trade equilibrium with φ = 1 if LP/LR ≥ 1/τ .
Equation (6) reveals that a higher LP/LR, i.e. higher similarity between the two countries,
is associated with a higher trade intensity φ. In Figure 3 we draw φ (vertical axis) against
relative labor endowments LP/LR (horizontal axis) holding worldwide resources P
¡
LR + LP
¢
constant. (A decrease in LP/LR is then a mean-preserving spread in world endowments.)
Figure 3
13Notice that there is international trade even when income differences become extremely large and LP /LR
becomes very small. The range of traded goods approaches zero, however, when LP /LR goes to zero.
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A reduction in LP/LR leads to a lower intensity of trade: a decreasing range of traded goods
NP + NRT is associated with an increasing range of non-traded goods N
R
N . In other words
as the similarity of the two countries in per capita endowments (and per capita incomes)
increases, the intensity of trade φ increases as well. The world economy reaches full trade
when LP/LR ≥ 1/τ . We summarize this discussion in
Proposition 1 a) When relative per capita endowments are sufficiently similar so that LP/LR
∈ [1/τ, 1], the general equilibrium features full trade. b) When per capita endowments become
sufficiently dissimilar so that LP /LR ∈ (0, 1/τ), the general equilibrium is characterized by
partial trade where a threat of parallel imports/exports constrains the prices charged for inter-
nationally traded goods in the rich country.
Proof. In text.
It is worth noting that this simple model features the famous Linder hypothesis. Linder
(1961) emphasized that the similarity of two countries, as measured by similarity in their per
capita incomes, should be an important determinant of trade between them.
4.4 Welfare and the gains from trade
We proceed by studying welfare implications and the gains from trade. In particular, we are
interested in how trade liberalizations (a reduction of τ) affect welfare and the distribution of
trade gains between rich and poor countries. In a full trade equilibrium, households in both
countries purchase all goods produced worldwide. Hence the welfare levels are identical in both
countries despite their unequal endowment with productive resources
UR,f = UP,f = a
P
¡
LR + LP
¢
aF + (1 + τ)P .
Firms’ price setting behavior drives this result. R-consumers are willing to pay higher prices
than P -consumers because their nominal income is higher. In the full trade equilibrium, higher
nominal incomes translate one to one into higher prices. Real incomes and welfare are therefore
identical. To see the mechanism by which welfare is equalized even though the two countries
have unequal welfare levels under autarky, consider firms’ mark-ups. By assumption, all firms
have identical production costs hence different prices reflect differences in mark-ups across
countries. Since in equilibrium profits are zero, the markups are fully used to cover fixed costs
and iceberg losses during transportation. Hence, the higher mark-ups in the rich country imply
that the rich country households bear a larger share of these costs.
In a partial trade equilibrium, welfare levels of consumers in the two countries diverge.
Country-P households purchase NRT + N
P goods and country-R households purchase NP +
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NRT +N
R
N goods. Using (3) and (4) we can calculate the welfare levels
UP,p = a
P(1 + τ)LP
aF + (1 + τ)P and
UR,p = a
P(1 + τ)LP
aF + (1 + τ)P + a
P
¡
LR − τLP
¢
aF + P .
Notice that while welfare in country R decreases in τ (lower trade costs or trade liberalization
increases welfare), the opposite is true for country-P welfare. We are now able to state the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 a) Compared with autarky, country P gains more from trade than country R.
b) R-consumers favor free trade, i.e. τ = 1, whereas P -consumers derive their highest utility
when there are trade barriers such that τ = min
np
aF/P + 1, LR/LP
o
.
Proof. The proposition can be readily demonstrated using Figure 4. Panel a) is drawn for
the case when LR/LP ≤
p
aF/P + 1 so that a full trade equilibrium emerges with moderate
trade costs. Panel b) is drawn for the case when LR/LP >
p
aF/P + 1 so that a full trade
equilibrium is not feasible. Country-R welfare (the bold graph) is monotonically decreasing in
τ in both panels of Figure 4. Hence the R-consumer reaches his maximum welfare when trade
costs have reached their lowest possible level, at τ = 1. However, the welfare of country P
(the dotted graph) increases in τ in both panels of Figure 4 when trade costs are sufficiently
low, i.e. in a situation where the world economy is in a partial trade equilibrium. A full trade
regime emerges in panel a) when τ ∈
£
LR/LP , (aF/P + 1)LP /LR
¤
where welfare decreases
in τ . The economies remain autarkic for even higher τ > (aF/P + 1)LP /LR where welfare
obviously becomes independent of τ . Figure 4 also shows that the highest welfare for country-
P consumers occurs at τ = LR/LP when LR/LP ≤
p
aF/P + 1 and at τ =
p
aF/P + 1 when
LR/LP >
p
aF/P + 1. Taken together, this yields the result in Proposition 2.
Figures 4a, 4b
Proposition 2 shows the crucial role of trade costs for welfare. Unequal countries have
different preferred trade barriers (or different preferred degrees of trade liberalizations). Con-
sumers in the rich country are essentially free-traders whereas consumers in the poor country
only want liberalization up to a positive level of trade costs. What is the intuition behind this
result? When the world economy has reached a partial trade equilibrium the threat of parallel
imports constrains prices in the rich country to pRT = τp
P . Further trade liberalization forces
country-P exporters to lower prices in country-R relative to prices in country P because price
discrimination is limited by factor τ . Hence the terms of trade for the poor country deteriorate
leading to the welfare loss.
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5 Population sizes versus per capita endowments
In the previous section, differences in incomes across countries were due to differences in per
capita endowments and the two countries had equally large populations. Let us now consider
the case when countries differ along both dimensions. This is interesting because it allows
us to gain insights on how the composition of aggregate income affects the extensive margin
of international trade under non-homothetic preferences (as standard new trade theory also
predicts that the two countries’ sizes affect trade volume).
With 0-1 preferences it becomes most transparent how the composition of aggregate in-
come affects the size of the home market if one considers a given product. As every house-
hold consumes exactly one unit of a given variety, a larger endowment of the representative
home-consumer leaves the size of the home market unchanged. For the same reason, a larger
population increases the home market one to one. For internationally active producers, having
a relatively larger home market means that trade costs are a relatively smaller part of total
costs. As firms located in a large country bear relatively fewer iceberg losses as a fraction of
their total costs, labor in a large country is more productive than labor in a small country.
5.1 Relative wages and general equilibrium
To see how different population sizes affect relative wages, we need to check the zero-profit
conditions of internationally active firms. Total revenues are given by pP
¡
τPR + PP
¢
and do
not differ by firm location. However, the amount of labor needed to serve the world market
does differ. It is given by F +
¡
PR + τPP
¢
/a for country-R firms and by F +
¡
τPR + PP
¢
/a
for country-P firms. We can calculate relative wages from the zero-profit conditions (note that
the formula is the same under both full and partial trade)
ω ≡ W
P
WR
=
aF + τPP + PR
aF + PP + τPR . (7)
It follows that ω R 1 if PP /PR R 1. Hence the compensation per efficiency unit of labor is
higher in the poor country when the poor country is larger and vice versa.
The discussion above suggests that a backward country in terms of per capita endowment
can get ahead in terms of per capita income if it has a large population. This raises an
interesting question. Could it be that a huge population raises incomes and willingness to pay
in country P so much that the parallel-trade constraint on price setting becomes binding in
country P rather than in country R? In other words, is it possible that producers in a poor
country with a large population face a threat of parallel trade leading to a "reversed" partial
trade equilibrium in which only a subset of poor-country varieties are internationally traded?
The answer is no. To see this, recall that the households’ budget constraints in a full trade
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equilibrium are W iLi = pi(NP + NR), i = R,P from which we can calculate relative prices
under full trade
pP
pR
=
aF + PR + τPP
aF + τPR + PP
LP
LR
.
Verification that limPP→∞ p
P/pR = τLP/LR < τ is straightforward. Even if the population in
country P becomes extremely large, country-P households’ willingness to pay — while eventually
exceeding that of country-R households — will remain below τpR. Hence arbitrage opportunities
and therefore a threat of parallel trade do not exist. In sum, a "reversed" partial trade
equilibrium will never emerge.
Figure 5 demonstrates that per capita incomes affect trade volumes for a given aggregate
size of the economy. The bold line represents the combinations of relative per capita endow-
ments and relative population sizes such that the world economy just enters the full trade
regime (FP-boundary). More precisely, along this line the relative willingness to pay pR/pP
are exactly equal to trade costs τ . Per capita incomes are more similar to the right of this
curve (LP /LR closer to unity) so that the relative willingness to pay is strictly lower than τ .
Per capita income differences are too dissimilar to the left of this curve, creating a threat of
parallel trade so that a partial equilibrium emerges.14 The figure shows that, whatever relative
population sizes PP/PR, the world economy can reach a full trade equilibrium provided that
relative per capita endowments LP/LR sufficiently approach unity. However, we cannot argue
in the same way with increases in relative populations. When per capita incomes are suffi-
ciently similar, an increase in population in the poorer country may push the world economy
out of a partial trade into a full trade equilibrium. However, when per capita endowments are
very dissimilar, LP/LR < 1/τ2, the world economy remains trapped in a partial trade equi-
librium even when relative population size PP/PR goes to infinity. In this sense, the model
predicts that per capita incomes are more important than population sizes in shaping patterns
of international trade.
To consider the distinct impact of per capita income, we draw a dotted ’iso-size’ line,
i.e. the combination of relative per capita endowments and relative population sizes for which
aggregate endowments of the two economies are identical, LPPP = LRPR. (Recall that, under
CES preferences, such a situation would feature a world equilibrium with perfect symmetry).
Since the iso-size line is flatter than the FP boundary, the two curves cross when LP/LR
becomes sufficiently low. Hence two countries with identical aggregate endowments end up in
partial trade when one country is rich but small and the other country is large but poor.
Figure 5
14The FP boundary is defined by ω(PP /PR)LP /LR = τ . From equation (7) we have ω0 > 0, which implies a
negative relationship between PP /PR and LP /LR.
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5.2 Welfare implications
When we allow populations to differ between the two countries, welfare implications remain
qualitatively unchanged. In a full trade equilibrium, the welfare levels are
U i,f = U i,f = a
PRLR + ω(τ)PPLP
aF + PR + τPP , i = R,P
the same for both countries. Comparing full trade with autarky, it may be that the rich (rather
than the poor) country gains more than the poor country. Welfare levels under autarky are
U i,a = Li/
¡
F/Pi + 1/a
¢
, i = R,P , which reveals that country-R households gain more from
full trade when LPPP/(LRPR) > (aF + PP )/(aF + PR). This situation arises when the
rich country is very small so that access to the large world market generates a large gain in
efficiency.
In a partial trade equilibrium we have
UP,p = a
¡
PP + τPR
¢
LP
aF + τPR + PP , and
UR,p = a
¡
PP + τPR
¢
LP
aF + τPR + PP + a
PR
¡
LR − ω(τ)τLP
¢
aF + aPR .
It can be shown that ∂UP,p/∂τ > 0 and ∂UR,p/∂τ < 0. Hence, allowing for unequal popula-
tion sizes does not change the welfare implications of a trade liberalization. When the world
economy is in partial trade equilibrium, a trade liberalization improves welfare of country-R
consumers but hurts consumers in country P . The reason is the same as above. In a partial
trade equilibrium, a trade liberalization deteriorates terms of trade for the poor country. The
higher relative price of imported goods implies that the consumption basket poor country con-
sumers can afford becomes smaller. The preferred level of openness is τ = 1 in the rich country
and τ̃ > 1 in the poor country, where τ̃ satisfies ω(τ̃)LP /LR = τ̃ . Notice that τ̃ is also the
critical level of trade costs that lets the world economy switch from a full trade to a partial
trade equilibrium.
6 Extensions
6.1 More than two countries
The above analysis examined the case of bilateral trade. In a two-country context, we demon-
strated that per capita incomes have a crucial impact on trade patterns and that the impact
of the aggregate size of an economy depends on whether size comes from per capita income
or from population. We also showed that trade liberalizations (a reduction in trade costs)
increase trade in a full trade equilibrium; but may decrease the volume of international trade
in a partial trade equilibrium. One could argue that the latter result is an unattractive feature
of our model.
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The above analysis has studied the case of bilateral trade. In a two-country context, we
have shown that per capita incomes have a crucial impact on trade patterns and the impact
of the aggregate size of an economy depends on whether size comes from per capita income or
from population. We have also shown that trade liberalizations (a reduction in trade costs)
increase trade in a full trade equilibrium; but may decrease the volume of international trade
in a partial trade equilibrium. One could argue that the latter result is an unattractive feature
of our model.
Two rich and two poor countries We show below that this result becomes much weaker
or completely vanishes once we allow for more than two countries. To make the point, we
consider the following interesting special case. Suppose there are four countries, identical in
all dimensions except for their per capita endowments. Assume further that there are two rich
countries, each of which has per capita endowment LN , the "North"; and two poor countries
with per capita endowment LS < LN , the "South". If LN/LS < τ there will be full trade,
each country buys all domestically produced goods and imports all goods produced in all other
countries. If LN/LS > τ , however, there is partial trade. Partial trade now means that not all
countries consume all goods, as the two poor (but not the two rich) countries consume only
a subset of the global menu of goods. Denote by pi and W i the willingness to pay and the
wage in country i ∈ {N,S} . Consider the partial trade equilibrium. The zero profit conditions
become
2pSP + 2τpSP =
µ
F +
1 + 3τ
a
P
¶
W i, i = N,S
for goods that are traded between all four countries and
2pNP =
µ
F +
1 + τ
a
P
¶
W i
for goods that are traded only among the two rich countries. Exactly as in the two-country
case, equal population sizes ensure factor price equalization, so we have WN =WS = 1. The
resource constraints are
LSP = NS
µ
F +
1 + 3τ
a
P
¶
in type S countries and
LNP = NNN
µ
F +
1 + τ
a
P
¶
+NNT
µ
F +
1 + 3τ
a
P
¶
in type N countries
where NS is the range of goods produced in each S country; NNT is the range of goods supplied
by firms in one of the N countries and traded worldwide; and NNN is the range of goods pro-
duced and traded only in the North. Since each Northern country imports all goods produced
worldwide but each Southern country imports only a subset of these goods, the aggregate
20
(regional) trade balance between North and South has to be balanced in equilibrium.15 The
value of aggregate Northern imports from the South are 2τpSNS and the value of aggregate
Northern exports to the South are 2pSNNT hence trade balance requires
τNS = NNT .
Calculating the number of goods that are produced worldwide from the equations above is
straightforward; it is equal to the level of welfare in the Northern country
UN (τ) = 2NS + 2NNT + 2N
N
N = 2
(1 + τ)LSP
F + 1+3τa P
+ 2
¡
LN − τLS
¢
P
F + 1+τa P
From this equation, it can be shown that ∂UN (τ) /∂τ < 0, i.e. the welfare level ofN -consumers
increases as a result of a trade liberalization. Notice that, similar to the two-country case, this
result arises because goods imported from the South become cheaper, creating demand for
new goods. In the new equilibrium, more goods are produced and traded in the North. The
deterioration (from the perspective of S countries) in the terms of trade leads to a situation
where fewer goods are traded between the Northern and Southern world regions. This effect is
similar to the two-country case. The increased threat of parallel trade induces Northern pro-
ducers to withdraw their products from the world market and to sell their product exclusively
in the rich Northern region.
The situation is somewhat different in the Southern countries. In particular, it may be that
a trade liberalization also increases welfare in the South. We saw that the poorer country is
strictly worse off as a result of lower trade costs in the two-country case. This need no longer
be the case in the multi-country case. While North-South trade will unambiguously decrease
due to a trade liberalization, lower trade costs will increase South-South trade. As a result,
the impact of trade liberalizations on welfare in the South is unclear. To see this, calculate the
welfare of the Southern consumer as
US (τ) = 2NS + 2NNT = 2
(1 + τ)LSP
F + 1+3τa P
15Due to the symmetry of our set-up, the volume of bilateral trade is undetermined. One of the Northern
countries could produce predominantly (or exclusively) goods that are consumed only in the North while the
other Northern country produces mainly (or exclusively) goods that are consumed worldwide. In that case,
the first Northern country runs a trade surplus with the other Northern country and a trade deficit with both
Southern countries taken together. Such trade imbalances cannot occur between the Southern countries, since
each Southern country consumes all goods produced by the other Southern country, meaning that the South-
South trade flows are of the same magnitude in either direction. However, each Southern country may run a
surplus with one of the Northern countries that is balanced by a deficit with the other Northern country. Notice
further that all bilateral trade flows are equalized in a full trade equilibrium. This is because all households in
each country consume all goods that are produced worldwide.
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from which ∂US (τ) /∂τ ≤ 0 follows when aF/P − 2 < 0. The South is more likely to gain
from lower trade costs if scale effects (lower aF/P) grow in importance. A uniform global
trade liberalization decreases N -S trade in this situation, but increased N -N and S-S trade
dominate this effect in such a way that global trade increases, proving our initial claim.
Three unequal countries Now consider the alternative interesting case with three equally
large but unequally rich countries, R, M , and P . The differences in endowments between any
bilateral combination of countries is sufficiently large such that min{LR/LM , LM/LP} > τ .
This latter assumption implies that the threat of parallel trade exists in all bilateral trade
flows. The equilibrium then takes the following structure. Households in country R consume
all goods produced worldwide; households in countryM consume only a subset of these goods;
and households in country P an even smaller subset. There are three groups of firms: firms
that sell worldwide, firms that sell in M and R, and firms that only sell in R. The latter
producers set a price pR that equals the willingness to pay of country R households. The
second group of producers sets a price pM in country M and τpM in country R. The first
group sets a price pP in country P, and a price τpP in countries M and R. The zero profit
conditions are given by 16
¡
pP + 2τpP
¢
P = W i
µ
F +
1 + 2τ
a
P
¶
i = P,M,R when selling worldwide (8)
¡
pM + τpM
¢
P = W i
µ
F +
1 + τ
a
P
¶
i =M,R when selling in M and R
pRP = WR
µ
F +
1
a
P
¶
when selling in R only.
Prices pP , pM and pR can be directly calculated from the zero profit conditions. To ensure
that we have τpP < pM the modified trade condition
(1 + 2τ)
¡
τ2 − 1
¢
τ2 − τ − 1 <
aF
P
has to be satisfied. This condition is stronger than Assumption 1, hence τpM < pR follows.
This condition ensures that all possible bilateral trade flows are strictly positive in equilibrium.
From equation (8) it is clear that equal population guarantees equal wages (per efficiency
unit of labor); this also holds in the three-country case. To see this, notice that country P
exports to both country M and country R. To ensure balanced trade, either country M or
16When specifying the zero-profit conditions, we have already implicitly assumed that goods are produced in
a country that also consumes this good. In particular, goods that are consumed exclusively in country R are
also produced in country R, and goods that are not consumed in country P are not produced in country P .
This will be the case in equilibrium because equal population sizes lead to factor price equalization across the
three countries WP = WM = WR and because larger profits margins (due to the absence of transport costs)
let firms first serve the home market before selling abroad.
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country R (or both) export to country P . When both countries export to country P , the first
zero-profit condition has to hold in all three countries, from which factor prize equalization
follows immediately. The situation is similar when only country M but not country R exports
to country P . Then the first zero-profit condition ensures factor price equalization between
countries M and P . In that case the country R runs a trade deficit with country P which has
to be offset by a surplus with country M . Ruling out the knife-edge case where country M
exports only to country P but does export to country R, we conclude that there must be some
goods country M exports to country R which establishes factor price equalization between M
and R. Taken together, we have WP =WM =WR = 1.
Solving the equilibrium is somewhat tedious but straightforward. Using resource con-
straints and the trade balance conditions between each country and the rest of the world yields
the following utility levels in the three countries (see Appendix 1)
UP (τ) =
1 + 2τ
F + 1+2τa P
LPP
UM(τ) =
1 + 2τ
F + 1+2τa P
LPP +
(1 + τ)
¡
LM/LP − τ
¢
F + 1+τa P
LPP
UR(τ) =
1 + 2τ
F + 1+2τa P
LPP +
(1 + τ)
¡
LM/LP − τ
¢
F + 1+τa P
LPP + L
R/LP − τLM/LP + τ − τ2
F + 1aP
LPP
These results allow us to determine the level of welfare in the three countries.
Proposition 3 In a three country model with sufficient endowment differences across coun-
tries, LR > τLM > τ2LP , and sufficiently low trade costs so that the modified trade condition
(1 + 2τ)
¡
τ2 − 1
¢
/
¡
τ2 − τ − 1
¢
< aF/P holds, the poor (rich) country loses (gains) from a
trade liberalization (lower τ). The middle income country gains from a trade liberalization if
LM/LP is not too large.
Proof. see Appendix.
If LP is sufficiently above zero, the middle income country gains from lower trade costs.
As in the two-country case, changes in the terms of trade drive the results. The terms of trade
improve for the rich country, both for trade with country P and country M . This improves
the welfare of country R consumers. The terms of trade deteriorate for the poor country, both
for trade with country M and country R. The situation is ambiguous for the middle income
country. Here terms of trade improve against the poor country but deteriorate against the rich
country. Hence it is not a prior clear whether country M will gain or lose. If the majority of
goods is imported from the poor country, overall terms of trade will improve. In contrast, if the
majority of goods is imported from rich country, overall terms of trade will deteriorate. The
terms of trade effect will be negative if country P is very poor (and hence LM/LP large). In
that case, the improvement in terms of trade with the poor country is negligible because the
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range of goods that can be imported from country P is small, and most goods will be imported
from country R, with which the terms of trade deteriorate.
6.2 Heterogeneous trade costs
Another reason why the effect of trade liberalizations on volumes may be less clear are hetero-
geneous trade costs. For clarity, we go back to the case of two countries that are symmetric
in all dimensions except for per capita endowments. Assume there are two product types,
type 0 has low trade costs τ0 and type 1 has high trade costs τ1 > τ0, but τ1 ≤
p
aF/P + 1
still holds. To keep things simple, we assume that a firm does not learn of the type of its
product until the fixed setup investment has been made.17 More precisely, a firm comes up
with a product of type 0 with probability π, and type 1 with probability 1−π. Assume further
that firms can insure themselves perfectly against high-cost realizations, meaning that all firms
make zero profits in equilibrium.
The interesting case is when the threat of parallel trade restricts firms of type 0 (low trade
cost) in their price-setting, while this does not apply to firms of type 1 (high trade cost). In that
case, there will be partial trade in low-cost varieties but full trade in high-cost varieties, and we
have pR0T/p
P
0 = τ0 and p
R
1 /p
P
1 < τ1. Notice that, since high-cost and low-cost varieties yield the
same utility, the prices of these goods do not differ by type, pP1 = p
P
0 = p
P and pR1 = p
R
0N = p
R.
Denote by Eτ ≡ πτ0 + (1− π) τ1 the expected trade cost, and by EpR ≡ πτ0pP + (1− π) pR
the expected price that an internationally active producer can charge in the rich country. The
zero-profit condition of internationally active firms and of exclusive country-R producers now
becomes
(EpR + pP )P = W i
∙
F +
P (1 +Eτ)
a
¸
and (9)
pRP = WR
∙
F +
P
a
¸
. (10)
When producers of type 1 do not face a pricing constraint, while producers of type 0 do, the
equilibrium has the following structure. All type 1 goods are traded internationally, while type
0 goods are only partially traded. This means country R produces πNR goods of type 0 and
(1− π)NR goods of type 1. The situation is analogous for country P .
The resource constraints for the two countries are now
LRP = NRT
µ
F +
P (1 +Eτ)
a
¶
+NRN
µ
F +
P
a
¶
(11)
LPP = NP
µ
F +
P (1 +Eτ)
a
¶
. (12)
17This formulation avoids a situation where firms with low transport costs make positive profits in equilibrium.
Allowing for profits would complicate the analysis but would not yield any substantial additional insights.
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Finally, the balance of payments condition is given by
NPEpR = NRT p
P . (13)
Equations (9) - (13) constitute a system of 6 equations in 7 unknowns: pR, pP , WR, WP , NP ,
NRT , and N
R
N . We get the seventh equation by the choice of the numéraire W
R = 1.
We can solve for the general equilibrium in this regime and calculate welfare levels. An
examination of the welfare level of country P — which is simply the sum of the worldwide
traded varieties — suffices for checking the impact of a trade liberalization. This yields
UP = NP +NRT = a
(1 + τ1 (1− π))P
aF (1− π) + ((1− π) + πτ0 + (1− π) τ1)P
LP .
It is straightforward to check that ∂UP /∂τ0 < 0 whereas ∂UP /∂τ1 > 0. Hence whether a
trade liberalization has a positive or a negative impact on the number of internationally traded
varieties is ambiguous and depends on the relative importance of the types of goods constrained
in price setting. When the proportion of high-trade cost products (1− π) is sufficiently large, a
general trade liberalization (a simultaneous reduction in τ0 and τ1) will increase the extensive
margin of international trade.
6.3 National versus international exhaustion rules
Up to now we were working under the assumption of unrestricted parallel trade. The implicit
assumption in the equilibria presented above was that there is "international exhaustion".
This means that the intellectual property owner (i.e. a patent-, copyright-, and/or trademark-
holder) loses its control of commercial exploitation when the product is sold on the national
or international market. Hence, international arbitrageurs force firms to restrict their inter-
national price schedules to deter parallel trade. In many countries, however, parallel trade is
restricted by law. For instance, the US applies "national exhaustion", meaning that a pro-
ducer’s patent or copyright expires when it is sold on the home market but not when sold on
the international market. Similarly, the EU applies "regional exhaustion" which allows paral-
lel trades only within the EU area. Parallel imports are restricted under national or regional
exhaustion.
By introducing a new policy parameter we now investigate the role of exhaustion rules.
Assume that ex ante there is an exogenous probability π that parallel trade is legally restricted
for a particular good. Think of π as representing the share of industries for which "national
exhaustion" applies (alternatively we can think of a world with "national exhaustion" rules,
but the enforcement of these rules is uncertain. π then represents the probability that the
rules are actually enforced). Firms learn only after paying the fixed costs F whether their
product is subject to parallel trade. To keep things simple, we go back to the case where both
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countries have the same population sizes PR = PP = P, so that we have wage equalization
WR = WP = 1. The zero profit conditions of internationally active and domestic firms,
respectively, become
EpP = F + (1 + τ)P
a
and pRP = F + P
a
where an internationally active firm’s expected sales are given by EpP ≡ π
¡
pP + pR
¢
P +
(1− π)
¡
pP + τpP
¢
P. (Notice that we implicitly assume that firms can perfectly insure them-
selves against low-price realizations in the case when no parallel trade restrictions apply. This
assumption keeps things simple because it means that all firms make zero profits in equilib-
rium.) Using the zero-profit conditions of internationally active producers, we can solve for
the price in the poor country
pP =
1
1 + τ − πτ
µ
F
P +
1 + τ
a
− π
µ
F
P +
1
a
¶¶
.
Using Assumption 1, it is easy to show that stricter enforcement of parallel import restric-
tions or, equally, a higher share of products with "national exhaustion" rules (both represented
by a higher π) is associated with lower prices pP for internationally traded products in the poor
country. The reason is that a higher π increases the incentive for rich-country firms to trade
internationally. This generates a pro-competitive effect reducing prices in the poor country and
thus increasing the welfare of the households there. The welfare of the rich country households
falls. To see this, notice that the number of goods produced in the poor country is still given
by equation (3) which does not depend on π. Using the budget constraint of poor consumers
LP = pP (NP +NRT ) lets us calculate
∂NRT
∂π
=
∂NRT
∂pP
∂pP
∂π
> 0
Since the number of goods produced in the poor country remains unchanged, welfare of house-
holds in the poor country increases. The pro-competitive effect on price in the poor country
implies that poor consumers can afford more goods, improving their welfare. The opposite is
true for the rich country. As the higher π induces more rich country firms to trade internation-
ally, a larger fraction of resources is devoted to the production of these internationally traded
goods. Hence a smaller range of goods is produced in the rich country and the total number of
goods produced worldwide goes down. This establishes that welfare of rich-country consumers
falls.
The effect of trade liberalizations (lower τ) on trade is now ambiguous. To see this consider
first the case of "national exhaustion", i.e. π = 1. In such a situation producers can perfectly
price discriminate between countries and hence a full trade equilibrium always prevails. Lower
trade costs simply free resources to produce additional varieties. As all these additional varieties
will be traded, trade will increase as a reaction to the liberalization. We have seen above that
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the converse holds for "international exhaustion", π = 0. Thus, in general the effect of a
trade liberalization depends on the share of products with "national exhaustion" rules π, with
positive effects more likely the closer π is to one.
6.4 Within-country inequality
Non-homotheticities not only generate important effects of per capita endowments on trade,
they also imply that within-country inequality may shape trade patterns in an important way.
In our context, the case of within-country inequality can be best understood as a special case
of a multi-country model, where the trade costs between some countries are zero. Between
these countries, the parallel trade restrictions would immediately become binding as long as
there is a slight difference in per capita endowments. In other words, with inequality within
countries we always have some degree of exclusion, meaning that some firms will only sell to
the rich charging a high price while other firms will sell to all consumers.
We highlight the role of inequality by looking at the most simple case of two identical
countries that are both populated by rich and poor households. This simple example shows
which mechanisms are present in the more general cases. In particular, we demonstrate that
the threat of parallel trade under within country inequality affects trade patterns even when
countries are completely symmetric.
Low trade costs We assume that β percent of the population in every country are poor
owning an endowment of θL < L and that the remaining 1− β percent of the population are
rich and own an endowment [(1− βθ) / (1− β)]L > 1 (hence per capita endowment is still L).
We index rich and poor households by r and p, respectively. Let us first consider the case
when trade costs are low. In a fully integrated market when τ = 1 there are two group of
firms: "mass producers" selling to all consumers in both countries and "exclusive producers"
selling only to the rich in both countries. In fact, this equilibrium holds true for small values
of τ such that the scope for price discrimination between countries is limited. By symmetry,
we have factor price equalization and set W = 1. Using countries’ resource-constraints, firms’
zero-profit and households’ budget constraints,18 it is straightforward to calculate the number
of products, Np and Nr, sold to everyone and to the rich, respectively, as
Np =
θaL
aF/P + 1 + τ and N
r =
(1− θ)aL
aF/P + (1 + τ) (1− β) .
18The resource constraint is given by LP = Np [F + (1 + τ)P/a] + Nr [F + (1− β) (1 + τ)P/a] in both
countries, the zero-profit conditions are 2ppP = F + (1 + τ)P/a for firms that sell to all households worldwide
and 2(1 − β)prP = F + (1 − β) (1 + τ)P/a for firms that sell only to rich households in both countries. Rich
households’ budget constraints are given by [(1− βθ) / (1− β)]L = 2prNr +2ppNpin both countries, and poor
households’ budget constraints are θL = 2ppNp.
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It is straightforward to study the impact of a trade liberalization. Using Up = Np and
Ur = Np +Nr it follows that both rich and poor consumers gain from a trade liberalization.
While the rich gain more in absolute terms, the poor gain more in relative terms. Hence a trade
liberalization even reduces consumption inequality Np/ (Nr +Np). This result generalizes to
the case of more types of consumers. Notice that this is quite different from inequalities across
countries where we saw that a fall in trade costs helps the richer but hurts poorer households.
High trade costs The above equilibrium arises if trade costs are sufficiently small. When
trade costs are higher, an equilibrium with exclusive producers selling only to rich consumers
and mass producers selling to all consumers worldwide no longer exists. The reason is that
high trade costs make a new strategy attractive: sell to all consumers at home and only to
rich consumers abroad. It can be shown (notes available from the authors upon request)
that, depending on the extent of within-country inequality, either of two different equilibrium
scenarios will emerge. If inequality is high, the equilibrium is characterized by some firms
selling only to rich consumers in both countries while other firms follow a "separating" strategy:
selling to both types of households in the home market; and only to the rich on the foreign
market. With high within-country inequality, these strategies yield zero profit in equilibrium;
and they strictly dominate the strategy of selling to rich and poor consumers in both markets.
In contrast, if inequality is low and trade costs are high, the equilibrium is characterized by
the co-existence of firms selling to all households worldwide and firms selling to all consumer
on the home market and to rich consumers on the foreign market. The exclusive strategy,
i.e. selling only to the rich on both markets is not a profitable option. We find that trade
liberalizations increase welfare for both types of consumers. The results that, in relative terms,
the poor gain more than the rich from a trade liberalization continues to hold.
7 More general preferences
We assumed 0-1 preferences in the analysis above. On the one hand, this assumption yields
a framework that is highly tractable and generates closed-form solutions. On the other hand,
this assumption restricts households’ adjustments to the extensive margin. The standard CES
case with all adjustments happening on the intensive margin and our 0-1 case should thus be
understood as two polar cases. We go beyond these polar cases in this section and introduce
more general preferences that allow for adjustments on both margins. In particular, we will
show that the qualitative characteristics of the equilibria we obtained with 0-1 preferences carry
over to the case of more general preferences featuring both non-trivial intensive and extensive
margins.
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We take up the analysis of Section 4 where we study two equally large, but unequally rich
countries. Within countries, households are identical. Trade patterns are therefore shaped
by differences in per capita endowments across countries. Now replace 0-1 preferences by the
following general utility function
U =
Z ∞
0
v(c(j))dj,
where c(j) denotes the consumed quantity of good j. It is assumed that the subutility v()
satisfies v0 > 0, v00 < 0 and v(0) = 0. Beyond these standard assumptions on v(), we make
two further crucial assumptions: (i) v0(0) < ∞ and (ii) −v0(c)/[v00(c)c] is decreasing in c.
The former assumption implies that reservation prices are finite and there is therefore a non-
trivial extensive margin of consumption; the latter assumption implies that the price elasticity
of demand is decreasing along the demand curve. Notice that monopolistic pricing implies
p = (1 + v0(c)/[v00(c)c])−1W/a. To ease notation, we denote by μ(c) ≡ (1 + cv00(c)/v0(c))−1 a
monopolistic firm’s mark-up. Since −v0(c)/[v00(c)c] is decreasing in c, we have μ0(c) > 0.
It is straightforward to see that finite reservation prices again make an autarky equilib-
rium possible. To ensure that there will be trade, we have to adjust the trade condition of
Assumption 1 as follows
Proposition 4 Denote by cRa consumption per variety under autarky in the rich country. If
trade costs are sufficiently small τ < μ(cRa )v
0(0)/v0(cRa ) where aF/P = cRa (μ(cRa ) − 1), trade
occurs in equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is based on the same tenet as in section 3 above. We determine the
autarky equilibrium and ask under which conditions an entrepreneur has incentives to sell his
products abroad. Setting W = 1, optimal monopolistic pricing implies p = μ(c)/a. With free
entry, profits P(pRa − 1/a)cRa must equal set up costs F
aF/P =
¡
μ(cRa )− 1
¢
cRa (14)
The equilibrium is symmetric for all firms, hence the resource constraint reads
LR = NRa
¡
F + PcRa /a
¢
(15)
Solving (14) and (15) for cRa and N
R
a , we see that c
R
a does not depend on L
R. Hence when
the two countries differ only in Li but have equal populations, intensive consumption levels
under autarky are identical between the two countries, cRa = c
P
a . Selling one marginal unit
abroad at price v0(0)/λPa , allows the purchase of v
0(0)/(λPa p
P
a ) foreign goods. Since λ
P
a =
v0(cPa )/p
P
a and c
R
a = c
P
a this is equal to v
0(0)/v0(cRa ) > 1. Reselling this (new) product at
home, yields a price v0(0)pRa /v
0(cRa ) minus trade costs. Hence, this strategy is profitable if
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£
v0(0)pRa /v
0(cRa )
¤
·
£
v0(0)/v0(cRa )
¤
> τ2. Expressing pRa in terms of c
R
a , we get the condition of
the Proposition.
We are now able to discuss the full trade regime. Let us start from a full trade equilibrium
where differences in per capita endowment LP/LR are sufficiently close to unity, so that firms
do not face a threat of parallel trade. We denote the optimal price of a country-R firm on its
home market by pRR and the corresponding price in country P by p
P
R. Monopoly pricing implies
pRR = μ(c
R
R)/a and p
P
R = μ(c
P
R)τ/a, respectively. The firm does not face any threat of parallel
trade if pRR/p
P
R ≤ τ , or if
μ(cRR)
μ(cPR)
≤ τ2. (16)
This is a sufficient condition for the existence of a full trade equilibrium.
Let us now consider the existence of a partial trade equilibrium. A necessary condition for
such an equilibrium is that condition (16) is violated. This condition may be violated either
if τ is close to unity, or if consumption levels cRR and c
P
R diverge strongly (recall that μ
0(c) > 0
and μ(0) = 1).19 If LP approaches zero, cPR approaches zero as well, and the denominator in
equation (16) approaches unity. There is thus a level of trade cost τ sufficiently close to unity
and/or a country-P endowment LP sufficiently small, so that we get μ(cRR) > τ
2μ(cPR).
When the inequality in (16) is violated, exporting firms will set prices pRR/p
P
R = τ to prevent
parallel trade. Notice, however, that violation of condition (16) does not necessarily imply a
partial trade equilibrium. The reason is that there is adjustment both along the extensive
margin and along the intensive margin. Even when condition (16) is violated, all goods may
be traded as country-P households may still consume all goods produced worldwide, but in
lower quantities. In other words, violation of the condition (16) is necessary but not sufficient
for a partial trade equilibrium.
To show under which conditions country-P households will not consume all goods produced
worldwide, we need to look at incentives of country-R firms to sell their products exclusively
to rich domestic consumers. The profit of a country R producer is given as follows (to ease
notation let us write pRR ≡ τp and pPR ≡ p)
π = P (τp− 1/a) cRR + P (p− τ/a) cPR.
The demand curve of country-R consumers is given by v0(cRR) = λ
Rτp and the corresponding de-
mand curve of country-P consumers is v0(cPR) = λ
Pp.Hence we have, dcRR/dp = (1/p)v
0(cRR)/v
00(cRR)
and dcPR/dp = (1/p)v
0(cPR)/v
00(cPR). The first order condition of the monopolistic firm’s price
19By d’Hôpital’s rule, noting that v(0) = 0 and v0(0) finite, limc→0 v0(c)c/v(c) = limc→0 1 + v00(c)c/v0(c).
However, limc→0 v0(c)c/v(c) = v0(0) · limc→0 c/v(c) = v0(0)/v0(0) = 1. This implies limc→0 v00(c)c/v0(c) = 0 and
limc→0 μ(c) = 1.
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setting choice is given by
τp− 1/a
τp
µ
− v
0(cRR)
v00(cRR)
¶
+
p− τ/a
p
µ
− v
0(cPR)
v00(cPR)
¶
= τcRR + c
P
R.
To examine whether a partial trade equilibrium exists, let LP and therefore cPR approach zero.
The first order condition then becomes
τp− 1/a
τ2p
µ
− v
0(cRR)
v00(cRR)c
R
R
¶
+
p− τ/a
τpcRR
Ã
− lim
cPR→0
v0(cPR)
v00(cPR)
!
= 1 (17)
Now consider the optimal decision of a country-R firm which decides to produce for domestic
consumers only. Denoting by pN and cNR price and quantity of non-traded goods, the first order
condition for exclusive producers is
pN − 1/a
pN
µ
− v
0(cNR )
v00(cNR )c
N
R
¶
= 1. (18)
We now compare equations (17) and (18) for the case where τ is sufficiently close to 1 such
that p > τ/a. If v0(0)/v00(0) is larger than zero - which is fulfilled if v00(0) is finite - the price of
a non-exporting firm pN is strictly larger than the price of an exporting firm τp. Since cPR → 0
when LP → 0, export revenues are zero, hence profits of the non-exporting firm must be higher
because it sets the profit maximizing price pN > τp. This implies that an outcome where all
firms export cannot be an equilibrium — provided that LP is sufficiently close to zero and τ is
sufficiently close to one. We summarize our discussion in
Proposition 5 If v00(0) is finite, a partial trade equilibrium always exists.
Proof. In text.
Note that v00 (0) all is always finite when preferences are HARA20 with v0(0) <∞.
8 Conclusions
This paper incorporates non-homothetic preferences into a standard "new" trade theory frame-
work. We propose modeling non-homotheticities by indivisible consumer goods that are either
consumed in unit quantity or not consumed at all. Such a specification implies that consumer
choice is along the extensive margin whereas a choice along the intensive margin of consump-
tion is ruled out by assumption. This is orthogonal to the standard CES-framework where
households have infinite reservation prices and the allocation of expenditures relates solely to
the intensive margin of consumption.
20Well known and often used special cases of the HARA class with v0 (0) < ∞ are quadratic preferences or
Stone-Geary with negative minimum consumption, for example.
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We elaborate the role of per capita incomes in international trade patterns which, for given
aggregate output, is absent in any homothetic model of international trade. Consider two
countries with the same aggregate endowment, one country is small and rich and the other
country is large and poor. Our model predicts that large differences in per capita endowments
lead to a partial world trade equilibrium in which many goods produced in the rich country
will not be traded and consumed in the poor country, while all goods produced in the poor
country will be traded and consumed in the rich country. In contrast, when differences in
per capita endowments are small, a full trade equilibrium emerges. In such an equilibrium, all
goods produced in the two countries are traded internationally and consumed in both countries.
Hence our model features the famous Linder hypothesis according to which countries that are
more similar in per capita endowments trade more intensively with one another.
Our analysis provides us with a simple general equilibrium framework of parallel trade.
The partial world trade equilibrium emerges when inequality across countries is high so that
differences across countries in consumers’ willingness to pay for differentiated products are
very large. In that case, the threat of parallel trade limits the scope of price setting in the
rich country. This is because arbitrage traders can purchase the good cheaply in the poor
country, ship it back and underbid local producers in the rich country. To inhibit such parallel
trade, internationally active firms have to set low prices in the rich country. In equilibrium,
firms in the rich country are indifferent between selling their product on the world market and
selling their product only on the home market. The general equilibrium perspective of our
model makes the fraction of internationally active firms endogenous. This effect is typically
not considered in partial equilibrium settings of parallel trade but has a potentially important
impact on trade patterns.
Concerning the welfare effects of trade, we find that a trade liberalization (a reduction in
iceberg trade costs) increases welfare of consumers in both countries when the world economy
is in a full trade equilibrium, but hurts the poor country (and benefits the rich country) when
the world economy is in a partial trade equilibrium. The reason for the latter result is that
exporters of the poor country need to reduce prices of traded goods in the rich country to
inhibit parallel trade, while exporters of the rich country have no such restrictions in the poor
country. Consumers in the rich country face decreasing prices, and consumers in the poor
country are confronted with a lower range of import goods because higher competition on the
world market induces rich-country firms to concentrate their sales exclusively on the home
market.
While our analysis is made under very specific assumptions, our model is simple enough
to be extended in several directions. We extended our set-up to more than two countries, to
heterogeneous trade costs, to commercial policies, and to within-country inequality. Finally,
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we showed that partial trade equilibria emerge for a broad class of more general preferences.
Our model is complementary to existing supply side approaches and potentially helpful
in understanding the dynamics of world trade patterns that arise due to major changes in
the distribution of world purchasing power. This is particularly relevant in the case of large
emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil, etc. that have experienced high growth in
per capita incomes over the past decades. From an empirical point of view, disentangling the
demand effects emphasized in this paper from the supply/technology factors emphasized in
the standard model is of particular interest.
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A Appendix 1: Three-country equilibrium
In equilibrium, the current account of each with the rest of the world has to be equalized.
Denoting by N ij the imports of country j from country i, balanced trade implies
2τpPNMP = p
P
¡
NMP +N
R
P
¢
for country P
(1 + τ)pPNMP + τp
MNMR = p
MNRM + τp
P
¡
NPM +N
R
M
¢
for country M
(1 + τ)pPNRP + p
MNRM = τp
MNMR + τp
P
¡
NPR +N
M
R
¢
for country R
Note that we have 5 linearly independent equations and 6 unknowns (the prices pi, i ∈
{P,M,R} are determined by the zero profit conditions). Hence, it is only possible to de-
termine the sum of
¡
NMP +N
R
P
¢
. Because of this indeterminacy we are free to consider the
case where all bilateral trade flows are balanced.21 Then we have
τNPP = N
M
P = N
R
P and τN
M
M = N
R
M .
Using the resource constraints we may calculate the goods produced in the three countries
NPP =
LPP
F + 1+2τa P
, NMP =
τLPP
F + 1+2τa P
, NRP =
τLPP
F + 1+2τa P
NMM =
¡
LM − τLP
¢
P
F + 1+τa P
NRM =
τ
¡
LM − τLP
¢
P
F + 1+τa P
NRR =
£
LR − τLM − τ(τ − 1)LP
¤
P
F + 1aP
.
21Notice that countries M and R consume all goods produced in country P ; and country R consumes all
goods produced in country M .
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B Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 3
Clearly, we have ∂UP (τ)/∂τ > 0. We check the sign of the derivative ∂UM(τ)/∂τ.
∂UM(τ)
∂τ
= LPP 2F£
F + 1+2τa P
¤2 − LPP 2F£
F + 1+τa P
¤2 + LPP
£
LM/LP + 1− 2τ
¤
F − (1+τ)
2
a P£
F + 1+τa P
¤2 < 0
iff£
F + 1+τa P
¤2£
F + 1+2τa P
¤2 < −
¡
LM/LP − τ
¢
F + (1 + τ)(F + (1+τ)a P)
2F
In the special case LM/LP = τ the inequality becomes [
F+1+τ
a
P]2
[F+ 1+2τa P]
2 <
(1+τ)(F+ (1+τ)
a
P)
2F . Hence,
when LM/LP is not too large, the middle income country will gain.
Finally, ∂
£
UP (τ)P + UM(τ)P + UR(τ)P
¤
/∂τ < 0.As ∂NRR /∂τ < 0, we must have ∂U
R(τ)/∂τ <
∂UM(τ)/∂τ. Hence, ∂UR(τ)/∂τ < 0 whenever ∂UP (τ)/∂τ > 0.
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Figure 1: Demand function
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Figure 2: Partial vs. full trade equilibria
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Figure 3: Trade intensity as a function of relative per‐capita endowments
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Figure 4: Welfare and trade costs
RP UU
panel a 
RP UU
panel b
, ,
τPR LL1
τ
1 1/ +PaF1/ +PaF
Figure 5: Relative per‐capita endowments vs. relative population sizes
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